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Abstract
Compared to 2D face presentation attacks (e.g. printed
photos and video replays), 3D type attacks are more chal-
lenging to face recognition systems (FRS) by presenting 3D
characteristics or materials similar to real faces. Existing
3D face spoofing databases, however, mostly based on 3D
masks, are restricted to small data size or poor authenticity
due to the production difficulty and high cost. In this work,
we introduce the first wax figure face database, WFFD,
as one type of super-realistic 3D presentation attacks to
spoof the FRS. This database consists of 2200 images with
both real and wax figure faces (totally 4400 faces) with a
high diversity from online collections. Experiments on this
database first investigate the vulnerability of three popular
FRS to this kind of new attack. Further, we evaluate the
performance of several face presentation attack detection
methods to show the attack abilities of this super-realistic
face spoofing database.
1. Introduction
With the widespread face recognition technologies, the
security and privacy risks of face recognition systems (FRS)
have been increasingly become as a critical issue in both
academia and industry. Face presentation attacks are one
of the most easily realized threats by presenting an artificial
object or a copy or synthetic pattern of faces to the biomet-
ric data capture subsystem [9]. Based on the way to gener-
ate the face artifact, face presentation attacks can be classi-
fied into 2D modalities (which present printed/digital pho-
tographs or recorded videos on the mobile/tablet), and 3D
type (by wearing a mask or presenting a synthetic model).
Because of the simplicity, efficiency, and low cost of
making 2D type attacks, current systems and research pay
more attentions to 2D face presentation attacks. How-
ever, with similiar 3D structures or materials to real faces,
3D face presentation attacks are more hyper-realistic, and
therefore, more powerful to attack the FRS while more dif-
ficult to detect. For example, as shown in Figure 1, even
some systems, which have already taken presentation attack
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Examples of 3D presentation attack cases. (a)
Android phones fooled by a 3D-printed head1, (b) iPhone
X face ID unlocked by a 3D mask2.
detection (PAD) into consideration, can be fooled by the 3D
face presentation attacks.
Existing 3D presentation attacks are mostly based on
wearable face masks. 3D facial mask spoofing was pre-
viously thought impossible to become a common practice
in the literature [40], because compared to 2D type at-
tacks, 3D masks are much more difficult and high-cost
to manufacture, requiring special 3D devices and ma-
terials. In recent years, the rapid advancement of 3D
printing technologies and services has made it easier and
cheaper to make 3D masks. Several 3D mask attack
databases have been created, inlcuding the 3DMAD (3D
Mask Attack Database [11]), the 3DFS-DB (3D-face spoof-
ing database [14]), the HKBU-MARs (HKBU 3D Mask At-
tack with Real World Variations Database [24]), and the
SMAD (Silicone Mask Attack Database [28]).
Although these 3D presentation attack databases have
collected different 3D masks based on the third-party ser-
vices [11, 24], by self-manufacturing [14], or from online
resources [28], the databases are restricted to small data
sizes (mostly less than 30 subjects) or low mask qualities.
1Picture is downloaded from https://www.forbes.com/sit
es/thomasbrewster/2018/12/13/we-broke-into-a-bun
ch-of-android-phones-with-a-3d-printed-head/#1d
e03dee1330.
2Picture is downloaded from https://www.theregister.co
.uk/2017/11/28/iphone_x_face_id_system_cracked_ag
ain/.
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This will not only limit the attack abilities of these fake
faces, but also limit research works in reporting robust de-
tection performance against 3D presentation attacks.
To address this problem, we take advantage of the popu-
larity and publicity of numerous celebrity wax figure mu-
seums in the world, and collect a large number of wax
figure images to form the new Wax Figure Face Database
(WFFD). These life-size wax figure faces are all carefully
designed and made in clay with wax layers, silicone or
resin materials, so that they are super-realistic and similar
to real faces. With the development of wax figure manufac-
ture technologies and services, we think the easily obtain-
able and super-realistic wax figure faces will pose threat to
the face recognition systems. Therefore, we introduce these
wax figure faces as a new challenging type of 3D face pre-
sentation attacks in this paper, and analyze their impact on
face recognition.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first wax figure
face database, also with a large data size and high diver-
sity. Altogether, the WFFD consists of 2200 images of 450
subjects (with both real and wax figure faces, totally 4400
faces), which are diversified in subject age, ethnicity, face
pose, facial expression, recording environment, and cam-
eras, and therefore closer to the practical situation. Based
on the new database, we first investigate the vulnerability
of three popular face recognition systems to these super-
realistic presentation attacks, and further evaluate the per-
formance of several popular face PAD methods to show the
attack ability of this 3D face spoofing database.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the related research in 3D face presenta-
tion attack databases and PAD methods. The new WFFD
database is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the
experiments and results on the proposed database. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
2.1. Existing 3D face presentation attack databases
Most existing 3D face presentation attack databases cre-
ate attacks by presenting wearable face masks, which are
made of different materials with similar 3D face characteris-
tics to the real faces. 3DMAD [11] is the first publicly avail-
able 3D mask database. It used the services of ThatsMy-
Face3 to manufacture 17 masks of users, and recorded 255
video sequences with an RGB-D camera of Micsoft Kinect
device for both real access and presentation attacks. This
database is widely used by providing color images, depth
images, and manually annotated eye positions of all face
samples.
With the development of 3D modeling and printing tech-
nologies, from 2016, more mask databases were created.
3http://thatsmyface.com/.
3DFS-DB [14] is a self-manufactured and gender-balanced
3D face spoofing database. They made 26 printed models
using two 3D printers: the ShareBot Pro and the CubeX4,
which are relatively low-cost and worth about 1000 and
2000 e, respectively. Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene
(ABS) plastic material is used to generate the physical ar-
tifacts. HKBU-MARs [24] is another 3D mask spoofing
database with more variations to simulate the real world
scenarios. It generated 12 masks from two companies
(ThatsMyFace and REAL-F5) with different appearance
qualities. 7 camera types and 6 typical lighting settings
are also included to form totally 1008 videos. To include
more subjects, the SMAD database [28] collected and com-
piled videos of people wearing silicone masks from online
resources. It contains 65 genuine access videos of peo-
ple auditioning, interviewing, or hosting shows, and 65 at-
tacked videos of people wearing a complete 3D structure
(but not customized) mask around the head which fits well
with proper holes for the eyes and mouth.
Besides, there have been some 3D mask spoofing
databases with special lighting information for more effec-
tive detection. The MLFP database [2] (Multispectral Latex
Mask based Video Face Presentation Attack database) is a
unique multispectral database for face presentation attacks
using latex and paper masks. It contains 1350 videos of 10
subjects in visible, near infrared (NIR), and thermal spec-
trums, which are captured at different locations (indoor and
outdoor) in an unconstrained environment. Similarly, the
ERPA database [8] also provides the RGB and NIR images
of both bona fide and 3D mask attack presentations cap-
tured using special cameras. This is a small dataset with
frame images of 5 subjects stored. The depth information
is also provided. Both rigid resin-coated masks and flexible
silicone masks are considered.
These databases have played a significant role in design-
ing multiple detection schemes against 3D face presenta-
tion attacks. However, they still face the problems of small
database size, low diversity, or poor authenticity, which will
certainly limit the development of effective and practical de-
tection schemes.
2.2. 3D face PAD methods
Due to the smaller texture defects, better preserved mo-
tion, and more geometric properties in 3D face presenta-
tion attacks, detection of 3D fake faces is more challeng-
ing than detecting fake faces with 2D planar surfaces. Ex-
isting PAD methods for 3D face presentation attacks can
be broadly classified into five categories, namely, the re-
flectance properties based, texture based, shape based, deep
features based, and liveness based methods.
The earliest studies in 3D mask spoofing detection were
4https://www.sharebot.it. and http://www.cubify.com.
5http://real-f.jp/en the-realface.html.
based on the reflectance difference of facial skins and mask
materials [17, 41, 39, 35]. This kind of methods can achieve
a good detection performance, but one main limitation is
the requirements of special and expensive devices to ac-
quire multispectral images at various wavelengths. Texture
based methods, differently, explore the texture pattern dif-
ference of real faces and masks with the help of texture fea-
ture descriptors, including the widely used Local Binary
Patterns (LBP) [18, 21, 12, 11], the Binarized Statistical
Image Features (BSIF) [32, 30], and Haralick features [1].
These methods are easy to implement, but their robustness
to different mask spoofing attacks needs further investiga-
tions. Shape based 3D mask PAD methods use shape de-
scriptors [19, 36, 15] or 3D reconstruction [38] to extract
discriminative features from faces and 3D masks. Instead of
extracting hand-crafted features, deep feature based meth-
ods [29, 27, 34, 23] automatically extracts features from the
face images, and trend to have a higher detection accuracy
and a better generalization ability.
Recently, some methods explore liveness cues to de-
tect 3D face presentation attacks, such as thermal signa-
tures [8], gaze information [3, 5, 4], and pulse or heartbeat
signals [25, 26, 16, 22]. Based on the intrinsic liveness sig-
nals, these methods achieve an outstanding performance in
distinguishing real faces from masks.
3. The wax figure face database
To address the issues in existing 3D face presentation at-
tack databases, we introduce the new WFFD database with
a large size and high diversity as super-realistic 3D presen-
tation attacks. The details of the data collection process,
and the evaluation protocols are presented in this section.
This Wax Figure Face Database is based on numerous
celebrity wax figure images from online resources. These
user-customized and life-size wax figure faces are all care-
fully designed and made in clay with wax layers, silicone
or resin materials, so that they are super-realistic. We first
downloaded multiple celebrity wax figure faces as attacks
with a high diversity in subject age, ethnicity, face pose,
expression, recording environment, and cameras, and then
collected the corresponding celebrity images as real access
attempts. For each subject, the wax figure face and real face
were finally grouped in one image to show the high authen-
ticity, as the examples shown in Figure 2.
Further, we introduce one more challenging scenario
where the wax figure face and real face were originally
recorded together, as shown in Figure 3. With the same
recording environment, and even the same face poses and
facial expressions, these images are more difficult to distin-
guish.
Altogether, the WFFD consists of 2200 images with both
real and wax figure faces of 470 subjects, totally 4400 faces.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of WFFD with six ex-
Figure 2: Examples of images in the Protocol I of WFFD
database.
Figure 3: Examples of images in the Protocol II of WFFD
database.
isting 3D face presentation attack databases. To evaluate
the performances of the face PAD methods on the WFFD
database, we further designed three protocols.
1) Protocol I : This protocol contains images grouped
manually, which means the wax figure face and real face
came from different recording devices and environment.
2) Protocol II: Images in this protocol record the wax
figure face and real face in the same environment with the
same cameras.
3) Protocol III: the previous two protocols are combined
to simulate the real-world operational conditions.
More details about the images used in each protocol are
shown in Table 2.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first investigate the vulnerability
of three popular face recognition systems to these super-
realistic 3D presentation attacks, and then evaluate the per-
formance of several popular face PAD methods on this 3D
face spoofing database.
Table 1: Comparison of 3D face presentation attack databases
Database Year #Subject #Sample Format Material Description
3DMAD [11] 2013 17 255 video paper, hard resin 2D color images + 2.5D depth maps
3DFS-DB [14] 2016 26 520 video plastic 2D, 2.5D images + 3D information
HKBU-MARs [24] 2016 12 1008 video / color images
SMAD [28] 2017 / 130 video silicone color images, from online resources
MLFP [2] 2017 10 1350 video latex, paper visible, NIR, thermal images
ERPA [8] 2017 5 86 image resin, silicone RGB, thermal, NIR images + depth
WFFD (proposed) 2019 470 2200 image wax figure high diversity, from online resources
Table 2: Number of images in each evaluation protocol
Protocol #Train #Development #Test #Total
Protocol I 600 200 200 1000
Protocol II 720 240 240 1200
Protocol III 1320 440 440 2200
* Note that the train, development, and test subsets have no overlap.
4.1. Performance evaluation metrics
Based on the ISO/IEC metrics, for the evaluation of
the vulnerability of FRSs, the Impostor Attack Presenta-
tion Match Rate (IAPMR) metric was used to report the
results, which can be considered as an indication of the at-
tack success chances if the FRS is evaluated regarding its
PAD capabilities [33]. It is defined as the proportion of
impostor attack presentations using the same Presentation
Attack Instrument (PAI) species in which the target refer-
ence is matched in a full-system evaluation of a verification
system.
For the detection performance evaluation, we reported
the results using the Attack Presentation Classification Er-
ror Rate (APCER), the Bona Fide Presentation Classifica-
tion Error Rate (BPCER), and the Average Classification
Error Rate (ACER). They are calculated as follows:
APCER =
1
Na
Na∑
i=1
(1−Resi) (1)
BPCER =
∑Nr
i=1Resi
Nr
(2)
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
(3)
where Na is the total number of attack presentations, and
Nr is the number of real samples. Resi equals to 1 if the
ith presentation is classified as an attack and 0 if classified
as real. Lower values of these metrics indicate better per-
formance of the PAD algorithms.
4.2. Vulnerabilities of face recognition systems
Three FARs were considered to show the vulnerabil-
ity towards detecting fake faces using the proposed WFFD
database, so that the attack abilities of the super-realistic
database can be demonstrated. They are two publicly avail-
able FRSs: OpenFace [6] and Face++ [13], and a com-
mercial system Neurotechnology VeriLook SDK [31]. Us-
ing the thresholds recommended by these FRSs, we calcu-
lated the IAPMR values on three protocols of the WFFD
database, as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: IAPMR of three Face Recognition Systems
Protocol Openface Face++ VeriLook
Threshold 0.99* 1e-5† 36**
Protocol I 93.29% 92.60% 76.14%
Protocol II 96.73% 96.22% 88.12%
Protocol III 95.25% 94.72% 81.75%
* Using a squared L2 distance threshold; †Using the confidence threshold
at the 0.001% error rate; ** Using the matching score when FAR=0.1%.
Table 3 shows that over 92% of the images in the three
protocols of the WFFD were successfully compared using
the Openface and Face+, which means the high attack suc-
cess chances of the proposed WFFD database on these two
face recognition systems. However, lower values of the
IAPMR can be seen when the VeriLook SDK was employed
on the three protocols. This is attributed to the fact that
some faces with special poses or low qualities cannot be
identified by the VeriLook SDK, therefore, leading to less
successful matches.
In addition, by comparing the results for Protocol I and
Protocol II, we can observe that higher IAPMR values were
achieved for images in Protocol II, where the fake faces
and real faces were recorded in the same scenarios with the
same cameras. This leads to the higher attack abilities of
images in Protocol II.
4.3. Detection performance of face PAD algorithms
Several face PAD methods were evaluated on the WFFD
database to show how they can work for the proposed
super-realistic 3D presentation attacks. These PAD methods
were based on different features, including the multi-scale
LBP [11], the color LBP [10], the Haralick features [1],
the reflectance properties [20], the multi-level Local Phase
Quantization (LPQ) [7], deep features based on the ResNet-
50 model [37] and VGG-16 model [27]. They all achieved
high detection performance against 2D spoofing attacks or
3D mask attacks.
In this experiment, for each image in the WFFD
database, the two face regions were first detected, cropped
and normalized into 64*64 pixel images. Based on different
PAD methods, features were extracted from the face im-
ages, and then fed into a Softmax classifier with a cross-
entropy loss function.
The detection results on Protocol I of the proposed
WFFD are shown in Table 4. We can see that existing seven
face PAD methods achieved high detection error rates for
this protocol, ranging from 17% to 46%. We attribute the
poor performances to the high diversity and super-realistic
attacks in the WFFD database, therefore, making it difficult
to detect real faces from wax figure faces recorded in dif-
ferent scenarios. Overall, due to the highly discriminative
features learned by the ResNet-50 models, the method [37]
achieved the best results, with the ACER of 19.27%. The
multi-level LPQ [7] based method also performed relatively
well, with the ACER of 25.12%.
Table 4: Detection error rates (%) of several PAD methods
on the Protocol I of the WFFD
Methods EER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [11] 33.17 31.22 31.22 31.22
Color LBP [10] 33.17 30.24 36.10 33.17
Haralick features [1] 32.19 25.85 37.07 31.46
Reflectance [20] 41.95 40.00 52.19 46.10
Multi-level LPQ [7] 24.88 24.88 25.36 25.12
ResNet-50 based [37] 17.07 20.49 18.04 19.27
VGG-16 based [27] 45.85 50.73 41.95 46.34
The best results are indicated in bold.
Table 5 presents the detection results using Protocol II on
the WFFD database. Compared with the results in Table 4,
we can see that most error rates for this protocol are higher
than the values for Protocol I. Such results are reasonable
since recording the real faces and wax figure faces in the
same scenarios with the same cameras results in less differ-
ences of the faces. Therefore, it is more difficult to detect
the presentation attacks in this protocol, also meaning the
higher attack abilities, which reached a similar conclusion
with the results in Table 3.
Similar to the results in Table 4, the ResNet-50 based
PAD method performed the best, achieving 21.83% ACER,
while the reflectance properties based [20] and VGG-16
based [27] method have no advantages in distinguishing real
faces from wax figure faces.
Table 5: Detection error rates (%) of several PAD methods
on the Protocol II of the WFFD
Methods EER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [11] 36.62 37.32 33.45 35.39
Color LBP [10] 37.32 36.62 41.90 39.26
Haralick features [1] 38.38 41.55 24.65 33.10
Reflectance [20] 44.37 50.70 44.37 47.53
Multi-level LPQ [7] 33.10 35.56 22.89 29.22
ResNet-50 based [37] 20.42 19.37 24.29 21.83
VGG-16 based [27] 48.94 40.14 52.82 46.48
The best results are indicated in bold.
The overall results of the seven evaluated PAD methods
on the WFFD database are shown in Table 6. The ACER
values ranged from 20.04% to 47.24%, showing the poor
detection performance of these methods against the pro-
posed wax figure face presentation attacks, and therefore,
the strong attack abilities of the WFFD database in face
recognition.
Table 6: Detection error rates (%) of several PAD methods
on the Protocol III of the WFFD
Methods EER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [11] 34.56 33.33 32.92 33.13
Color LBP [10] 36.81 35.38 35.79 35.58
Haralick features [1] 36.81 36.40 32.92 34.66
Reflectance [20] 44.78 46.01 46.22 46.11
Multi-level LPQ [7] 28.63 29.45 25.15 27.30
ResNet-50 based [37] 18.81 19.43 20.65 20.04
VGG-16 based [27] 48.67 45.19 49.28 47.24
The best results are indicated in bold.
5. Conclusion
To address the limitations in existing 3D face presenta-
tion attack databases, we have proposed a new database,
WFFD, composed of wax figure images with high diver-
sity and large data size as super-realistic face presentation
attacks. The database will be made publicly available in
order to help the development and fair evaluation of differ-
ent PAD algorithms. Extensive experiments have demon-
strated the vulnerability of popular face recognition systems
to these attacks, and the performance degradation of several
existing PAD methods in detecting real faces from wax fig-
ure faces, showing the challenges when wax figure face are
used for 3D attacks.
Some motion based methods, such as head movement
and blink detection based may seem quite effective in de-
tecting wax figure fake faces if the faces are recorded in
videos. However, nowadays the high-tech wax figure tech-
nologies have realized the intelligent wax figures, which
can not only move but also sense people and change its be-
haviour based on its surroundings. Therefore, it is demand-
ing to investigate more discriminative and powerful meth-
ods to detect these new challenging 3D face presentation
attacks in the future.
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